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Quantum protocols for coin-flipping can be composed in series in such a way that a cheating
party gains no extra advantage from using entanglement between different rounds. This composition
principle applies to coin-flipping protocols with cheat sensitivity as well, and is used to derive two
results: There are no quantum strong coin-flipping protocols with cheat sensitivity that is linear in
the bias (or bit-commitment protocols with linear cheat detection) because these can be composed
to produce strong coin-flipping with arbitrarily small bias. On the other hand, it appears that
quadratic cheat detection cannot be composed in series to obtain even weak coin-flipping with
arbitrarily small bias.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Lx
I. INTRODUCTION
Coin-flipping is the cryptographic problem where two
mutually distrustful parties try to agree on a random
bit. This is to be accomplished by sending sequential
messages over a communication channel.
The goal is that, if both players are honest and follow
the prescribed protocol, they both output the same bit,
which is uniformly random. The restriction is that, if ei-
ther party is dishonest, then the bit output by the honest
player must still be approximately random. The figure of
merit for a coin-flipping protocol is the bias, defined as
the maximum increase in the probabilities of the honest
player’s outputs that a cheating party can achieve.
There is a weaker version of the above problem, where
one party wants to obtain outcome zero, and the other
party outcome one. This corresponds more closely to the
colloquial idea of coin-flipping. In this case, the protocol
need only prevent a cheater from biasing the coin in favor
of his desired outcome. The two versions of the problem
are known respectively as strong and weak coin-flipping.
In the classical setting the problem is impossible with-
out some additional restrictions on the computational
power available to each party. Nonetheless, in the quan-
tum setting, where the parties can process quantum in-
formation and communicate over a quantum channel, the
goal can be partially achieved.
Ambainis [1] and Spekkens and Rudolph [2] have con-
structed strong coin-flipping protocols with a bias ǫ = 14 .
However, it was proven by Kitaev [3] (and summarized
in Ref. [4]), that all quantum protocols for strong coin-
flipping must have a bias of at least ǫ = 1√
2
− 12 ≃ 0.21.
Quantum weak coin-flipping is a little more promising.
The best known protocol is by Spekkens and Rudolph [5]
and achieves a bias of ǫ = 1√
2
− 12 . The only known bound
is due to Ambainis [1], and states that the number of
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rounds must grow at least as Ω(log log 1
ǫ
). In particular,
to obtain arbitrarily small bias, we must have protocols
with an ever increasing number of rounds.
Unfortunately, analyzing quantum protocols with a
large number of rounds is often difficult. One approach
to obtaining a weak coin-flipping protocol with arbitrar-
ily small bias could be to take a quantum coin-flipping
protocol with a fixed number of rounds, and compose it
in series with itself to obtain a better coin-flipping proto-
col. It is well known that quantum coin protocols com-
pose well in series, and an argument for this is given in
Sec. II.
Unfortunately, serially composing standard coin-
flipping protocols does not decrease the overall bias [6].
However, quantum mechanics is good at detecting state
disturbance, and other deviations from a protocol. It
is therefore possible to construct coin-flipping protocols
with cheat sensitivity, where a dishonest player may be
able to cheat by a significant amount, but only at the risk
of getting caught by the honest player. Cheat sensitive
protocols can produce improved coin-flipping protocols
when composed in series under certain conditions.
Quantum protocols with cheat sensitivity have been
constructed by Spekkens and Rudolph [5] where players
cheating by large amounts will get caught, but at least
one party can bias the coin by a small amount without
being detected. Aharonov et al. [7] have a protocol with
quadratic cheat detection on one side, but no cheat de-
tection on the other side. Hardy and Kent [8] devised a
protocol where neither player may cheat by any amount
without risking detection, but the functional form of the
cheat detection was not determined, though it is known
to be quadratic or worse. Functional forms of cheat de-
tection were also discussed in Ref. [9].
In the present paper, we will analyze the serial com-
position of cheat sensitive coin-flipping protocols. We
shall treat the cheat sensitive protocols as oracles or black
boxes, with a cheat sensitivity that is given by a function
of the target bias. This will lead to our two main results:
In Sec. III we show that quadratic cheat detection pro-
tocols, where the probability of getting caught is propor-
2tional to the square of the bias, are a fixed point of serial
composition, at least to leading order. This means that
no matter how many times the protocol is composed with
itself, the amount of cheat detection remains approxi-
mately the same. Because most known cheat sensitive
protocols are quadratic or worse, this result is evidence
that serial composition may not be useful to obtain weak
coin-flipping.
In Sec. IV we show that linear cheat detection cannot
exist for strong coin-flipping. This is done by compos-
ing the linear cheat detection to obtain a strong coin-
flipping protocol with arbitrarily small bias, in violation
of Kitaev’s lower bound. Note that the second result
only uses serial composition as a tool for the proof, and
the result holds for all cheat sensitive strong coin-flipping
protocols.
The result of Sec. IV also applies to bit-commitment,
which is a cryptographic protocol related to coin-flipping.
Coin-flipping can be constructed out of bit-commitment
as follows: first Alice commits a bit to Bob, then Bob
announces a random bit, then Alice reveals her bit and
the coin outcome is the xor of the two bits. Cheat de-
tection as a function of ǫ can be defined in a way similar
to Ref. [7]. For Alice, ǫ is the amount by which she can
change the probabilities associated with the committed
bit, whereas for Bob, ǫ is the additional probability of
guessing Alice’s committed bit correctly. Because lin-
ear cheat detection in bit-commitment can be used to
produce a strong coin-flipping protocol with linear cheat
detection, it is also ruled out as a possible quantum pro-
tocol.
II. SERIAL COMPOSITION OF QUANTUM
COIN PROTOCOLS
Protocols for coin-flipping can be naturally composed
in series to obtain new coin-flipping protocols. What
is surprising at first is that quantum protocols for coin-
flipping compose serially in such a way that a cheating
party does not get any unexpected advantage by using
entanglement. We shall prove this below, but let us first
define carefully what we mean by unexpected advantage.
Let P be any quantum coin-flipping protocol. At the
end of the protocol each player will output one of {0, 1, C}
where the last entry denotes the output when one player
catches the other player cheating. Let us assume that
Alice is honest and Bob is cheating. For each cheating
strategy employed by Bob, there will be a triple of prob-
abilities (P0, P1, PC), one for each of Alice’s possible out-
puts. Let ΩA(P) be the set of all such attainable triples.
Clearly (1/2, 1/2, 0) ∈ ΩA(P) since Bob can always play
honestly. If the protocol does not allow Bob to fully bias
toward 1 then (0, 1, 0) /∈ ΩA(P). Some protocols may not
have any cheat detection, in which case PC will always
be zero. For honest Bob and cheating Alice there is a
similarly defined ΩB(P).
Assume we take the protocol P and run it many times
in series. We are interested in proving that a cheating
player, say Bob, does not obtain any extra cheating power
by using entanglement between different rounds. That
is, that for every round j, independently of previous out-
comes and strategies used by Bob, any strategy that Bob
employs will make Alice output based on a triple of prob-
abilities in ΩA(P).
Clearly Bob can vary his strategy in each coin-flip
round, and even base his strategy on the outcomes of
the previous coin-flips. However, when flipping N coins
in series, Bob cannot obtain an outcome of all ones with
a probability greater than (P1,max)
N , where P1,max is the
maximum value of P1 over any triple in ΩA(P).
The reason that quantum coin-flipping can be serially
composed stems from the following conditions which are
always imposed on coin-flipping protocols:
1. There is always at least one honest party.
2. The details of the protocol, which can be described
in terms of fixed unitaries acting on a fixed initial
state, are known to all parties.
3. The protocol begins in an unentangled state, a con-
dition which can be enforced by the honest party.
The first condition arises because no constraint is im-
posed on the case when both parties are cheating, and
therefore the case never needs consideration. The third
condition is always imposed to avoid trivial protocols,
since establishing correlations is the goal of a coin-
flipping procedure.
The proof of composition is fairly simple. At the be-
ginning of the kth round, the cheater will be unentangled
from the honest player. The honest player has erased
her Hilbert space and reset it to the initial state of the
protocol. All that the cheating player has left over from
the previous rounds is some quantum state in his Hilbert
space. However, because the honest protocol is public,
the cheating player knows exactly the state of his Hilbert
space (which may be a mixed state, caused by the honest
player erasing her Hilbert space).
Now assume that he could, with the help of this state,
force the honest player (say Alice) to output with prob-
abilities not in ΩA(P). Then with the same state, he
could obtain the same results in the first round or even
when protocol P is used in a one-shot run, contradict-
ing the definition of ΩA(P). To put it another way, Bob
can simulate in his private Hilbert space the first k − 1
rounds and start playing the first round from that point,
but this clearly can give him no extra advantage.
The conclusion of this section is that, given a quantum
protocol for coin-flipping, we may treat the protocol as
a black box when composing it in series with itself (or
even with other coin-flipping protocols) without worrying
about entanglement between rounds. We shall use this
fact to derive two interesting results.
3III. QUADRATIC CHEAT DETECTION IS A
FIXED POINT OF COIN-FLIPPING
Because quantum coin-flipping composes in series, it is
tempting to try to use a classical game layer on top of a
known quantum coin-flipping protocol in order to reduce
its maximum bias. That is, we wish to construct a two
player classical game that uses the quantum coin as a
black box. The game could be, for instance, flipping a
coin N times, and the party that wins a majority of coin
tosses wins the game.
The ideal goal for this process would be to produce
a weak coin-flipping protocol with arbitrarily small bias.
While it is known that games built out of standard coin-
flipping protocols can never reduce the maximum bias,
the situation is different when cheat detection is avail-
able. Especially in the case of weak coin-flipping, where
an honest player may declare himself the winner if he
detects the other party cheating, there are certain black-
box protocols that can be used to produce arbitrarily
small bias. The question is how much cheat detection is
needed in order for successive compositions to improve a
coin-flipping protocol?
We will be interested in protocols with symmet-
ric, monomial cheat detection. Let P be a protocol
where both parties have equal cheating opportunities
(i.e., ΩA(P) = ΩB(P) ≡ Ω(P)) and such that all proba-
bilities (P0, P1, PC) ∈ Ω(P) have the form:
P0 = (1− PC)
(
1
2
+ ǫ
)
, (1)
P1 = (1− PC)
(
1
2
− ǫ
)
, (2)
PC ≥ a|ǫ|
b, (3)
which can be viewed as a function of a parameter ǫ that
is controlled by the cheating party. The constants a > 0
and b ≥ 0 denote the amount of cheat detection. Strictly
speaking, PC should also be considered a second param-
eter that can be controlled by the cheater, as he can
always use a less optimal cheating strategy. In practice,
a cheater will always minimize PC for a given bias, and
therefore we may assume equality in Eq. (3). We shall
call the case b = 1 linear cheat detection, and the case
b = 2 quadratic cheat detection.
When building games out of cheat sensitive coin-flips,
the outcome of the entire game will be “cheating” if
in any individual coin-flip a cheating outcome was ob-
tained. To leading order in epsilon, the composite game
will have a cheat sensitivity of the same form, with the
same coefficient b, but in general a different a. When b
is small, successive compositions increase a thereby pro-
ducing a more cheat sensitive protocol, whereas in the
large b regime composition has the opposite effect. We
intent to prove in this section that b = 2 is a fixed point
of coin-flipping. That is, for all possible games that use
a coin with quadratic cheat detection as a black box, the
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FIG. 1: “Best two out of three” game tree. Binary nodes
are labeled by the probability of winning for an honest player
trying to obtain outcome 0.
resulting protocol has exactly the same amount of cheat
detection to leading order in epsilon.
We begin by describing the set of all possible games
that employ a cheat sensitive coin-flip as a black box.
These can be put in correspondence with the set of bi-
nary trees, where the leaf nodes are labeled by either
zero or one. For instance, the tree corresponding to the
“Best two out of three” game is depicted in Fig. 1. Each
binary node corresponds to a coin flip, with up corre-
sponding to the outcome zero and down to the outcome
one. The leaves are endpoints of the game and their la-
bels correspond to the final game outcome at that node.
Other examples of games that produce coin-flips in-
clude “first outcome that is repeated N times” and “first
outcome to occur a total ofN times more than the other”,
both of which correspond to trees of infinite length. Al-
lowing for trees of infinite length also accounts for all
games that have a tie outcome, after which the game is
restarted. For trees of infinite length we impose the ad-
ditional constraint that when playing honestly, the prob-
ability of never reaching a leaf node is zero.
Let x be a variable that ranges over the binary nodes
of the tree. A general cheating strategy is a function
ǫ(x), which assigns a bias to each node where a coin-
flip takes place. We also define pǫ(x) as the probability
of arriving at node x given a cheating strategy ǫ(x). In
defining this quantity, we assume that if the cheater is
caught at a given node, the game stops, thereby reducing
the probability of arriving at the child nodes. In terms
of these quantities we can write the total probability of
getting caught:
PC,tot =
∑
x
apǫ(x) |ǫ(x)|
b
. (4)
To leading order in ǫ(x), we can replace pǫ(x) with the
probability of arriving at the node in the honest protocol.
This can be written as 2−D(x) where D(x) is the depth of
the node x, with the root node having depth zero. The
formula becomes:
PC,tot =
∑
x
a2−D(x) |ǫ(x)|b . (5)
To expand the total bias to leading order in epsilon,
we only need to keep track of terms that are linear in
4ǫ(x), and can therefore disregard the multiplicative factor
1− PC in the probabilities for obtaining zero or one. Of
course, we are assuming b > 1 at this point, and will soon
concentrate on b = 2. The probability of the cheater
obtaining his desired outcome, and winning the game,
satisfies a simple recursion relation:
PW (x) =
1
2
(
PW (x
↑) + PW (x↓)
)
+ǫ(x)
(
PW (x
↑)− PW (x↓)
)
, (6)
where PW (x) is the probability of winning having arrived
at node x, and x↑, x↓ are the two children of node x. At
the root node the probability of winning is
PW,tot =
1
2
+
∑
x
2−D(x)∆(x)ǫ(x), (7)
where ∆(x) = PW (x
↑)−PW (x↓), which can be computed
at this point from the honest probability of winning.
The total bias for the game is given to leading order by
|ǫtot| = PW − 1/2, where we have excluded cases where
the cheating benefits the honest player. For a given total
bias, the cheater will choose ǫ(x) to minimize the prob-
ability of getting caught. The calculation to minimize
PC,tot under the constraint of fixed ǫtot can easily be done
using a Lagrange multiplier, to obtain the result:
ǫ(x) = sgn(λ∆(x))
∣∣∣∣λ∆(x)ab
∣∣∣∣
1
b−1
, (8)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. We have allowed
ǫ(x) to range over the reals, but will show below that for
quadratic cheat detection the optimal solution satisfies
the requirement |ǫ(x)| ≤ 1/2.
To eliminate the Lagrange multiplier, we can substi-
tute the expression for ǫtot into the expression for PC,tot
to obtain:
PC,tot = anew |ǫtot|
b
, (9)
where
anew = a
(∑
x
2−D(x) |∆(x)|
b
b−1
)1−b
. (10)
For the case b = 2, the following lemma shows that
anew = a for all game trees:
Lemma: For all game trees as described above, we have
the equality ∑
x
2−D(x)∆(x)2 = 1. (11)
The lemma can be proven using a simple combinatorial
argument that is presented for the interested reader in
the appendix.
From Eq. (8) we see that for b = 2, the amount of
cheating at node x is proportional to ∆(x). The constant
of proportionality, as well as the Lagrange multiplier, are
fixed by Eq. (7). After eliminating a factor of 1 using
the above lemma we obtain that the optimal strategy is
ǫ(x) = |ǫtot|∆(x). This satisfies the intuition that the
cheater will choose a larger bias on coin-flips that are
more consequential. Furthermore, because |∆(x)| ≤ 1,
we have shown that the optimal strategy is achievable
(i.e., |ǫ(x)| ≤ 1/2 for every x) whenever |ǫtot| ≤ 1/2.
For other values of b near two, we can consider the
derivative of anew with respect to b. For any fixed graph,
this derivative is negative. The conclusion is that for
every graph, serial composition of b < 2 cheat detection
leads to improvement to lowest order, whereas in the b >
2 case the cheat sensitivity worsens.
The above results complete our argument that
quadratic cheat detection is a fixed point for coin-
flipping. The argument is only valid in the regime where
all biases, including the total bias, are small. Unfortu-
nately, because a protocol producing weak coin-flipping
with arbitrarily small bias would have to employ arbi-
trarily large trees, it is not sufficient to simply take the
small bias limit on a fixed tree.
In essence, associated with each weak coin-flipping pro-
tocol there is a function PC(ǫ) indicating the minimum
probability with which a party will get caught cheat-
ing if they try to bias the coin by ǫ. Composing this
protocol in series one obtains a new protocol with func-
tion PC,tot(ǫtot). That is, serial composition with a given
game tree induces a map from the set of functions PC(ǫ)
to itself. We have shown that, independent of the tree, if
the original function behaves as aǫ2 for small ǫ, then so
will its image.
The fact that the coefficient of the quadratic term re-
mains fixed under the map induced by every game tree
is a peculiar and interesting feature. It is indicative that
serial composition of quadratic cheat detection may not
be useful for producing weak coin-flipping with arbitrar-
ily small bias. However, further research in this direction
is needed in order to conclusively settle the issue.
IV. NO-GO THEOREM FOR LINEAR CHEAT
DETECTION
In this section we shall switch gears and focus on serial
composition of linear cheat detection protocols. We shall
prove that linear cheat detection can be serially com-
posed to produce not only weak coin-flipping but also
strong coin-flipping with arbitrarily small bias. Because
of Kitaev’s bound (discussed in Ref. [4]), the result in
this section proves that a strong coin-flipping protocol
with linear cheat detection cannot exist.
The result of this section only applies to strong coin-
flipping schemes with cheat sensitivity as described in
Eq. (3). An alternative not covered by the proof in this
section is the case where Alice can force outcome 1 (and
Bob can force outcome 0) without getting caught, which
corresponds to cheat sensitive weak coin-flipping. Be-
5cause weak cheat sensitivity can be simulated by strong
cheat sensitivity, the result of the previous section applies
to weak cheat sensitivity as well. However, the opposite
is not true, and the results of the present section do not
apply to linear cheat sensitivity in weak coin-flipping.
Since strong coin-flipping can be constructed out of bit-
commitment, the result of this section can also be applied
to cheat sensitive bit-commitment protocols. In fact, the
only known coin-flipping protocol, where neither side can
cheat by a finite amount without getting caught, is de-
scribed in Ref. [8], and is a strong coin-flipping protocol
that is constructed out of bit-commitment.
For the proof of the above statements, we assume the
existence of a quantum protocol P described by Eq. (3)
with b = 1 and some non-zero a. We shall describe a
game, that uses P as a black box, which achieves strong
coin-flipping with bias that becomes arbitrarily small in
the limit of a game parameter N → ∞. Though, for
the purposes of comparing against Kitaev’s bound, it is
sufficient to allow honest players to output “cheat” at the
end, we will construct the game so that the honest player
always outputs one of the outcomes zero or one.
The game is the random walk on a 1-D line, starting
from the origin, using the coin provided by P . The game
ends with the first arrival at one of the two sites ±N ,
with the right end corresponding to the outcome zero,
and the left end to one.
If one party detects cheating, they will continue the
game using a private fair coin, and output according to
the outcome of the game. Let z ∈ {−N, . . . , N} be a
variable that runs along the line. If cheating occurs when
the game is at z, then the honest players can simply
output using P0 = (N+z)/2N and P1 = (N−z)/2N . In
essence, the only deterrent to the cheater is that he may
be able to cheat more effectively in a future round. Note
that the honest party cannot just flip a balanced coin
after detecting cheating because in this case the cheating
party would only cheat when he is about to lose.
Because the honest player keeps no state beyond the
current location along the line, z, there is an optimal
cheating strategy where the bias only depends on z. That
is, we only need to consider functions ǫ(z) when maximiz-
ing over cheating strategies.
We assume that the cheating player is trying to bias
toward zero (i.e., the right side). We can then define the
function Wǫ(z) to be the probability of winning starting
from node z, using biases ǫ(z). The function is similar
to PW defined in the previous section, except that we
are now using large biases, which cannot be ignored in
calculating the probability of winning.
The function has the constraints Wǫ(N) = 1,
Wǫ(−N) = 0 and
Wǫ(z) = P0(ǫ(z))W (z + 1) + P1(ǫ(z))W (z − 1)
+PC(ǫ(z))
N + z
2N
. (12)
Clearly, for optimal strategies, Wǫ(z) ≥ (N + z)/2N for
all z because the cheating party can always play honestly.
The value of Wǫ(0) is simply the probability of win-
ning the entire game. The cheater will chose ǫ(z)
in order to maximize Wǫ(0). We shall prove that
max [Wǫ(0)− 1/2]→ 0 as N →∞.
The analysis is made easier by using a modified black
box protocol P ′ with achievable probabilities of the form:
P0 =
1
2
+ ǫ, (13)
P1 =
1
2
− (1 + a)ǫ, (14)
PC = aǫ, (15)
for 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ ǫmax where ǫmax = 1/(2 + 2a). For every ǫ,
protocol P ′ gives the cheater a slightly higher probability
of obtaining the desired outcome than with protocol P .
Therefore, any bounds on cheating obtained using P ′ as
a black box will apply when using P instead.
Consider using P ′ and varying independently each of
the nodes of the complete game tree. The bias ǫ(x) of
each node enters linearly into Wǫ(0), which can be maxi-
mized by letting the biases take only the boundary values
of 0 or ǫmax. As discussed above, the optimal biases will
depend only on the corresponding value of z, and there-
fore we need only consider functions ǫ(z) which take val-
ues in {0, ǫmax}.
The maximization is now easy to analyze. Define
δ(z) = Wǫ(z) − (N + z)/2N , which is the extra prob-
ability of winning that the cheater is getting at position
z. We shall prove below that
δ(z + 1) ≤
2 + a
2aN
=⇒ δ(z) ≤
2 + a
2aN
. (16)
If ǫ(z) = ǫmax the above statement is true because
Eq. (12) states that:
δ(z) =
(
1
2
+ ǫmax
)(
δ(z + 1) +
1
2N
)
(17)
=
2 + a
2 + 2a
(
δ(z + 1)−
2 + a
2aN
)
+
2+ a
2aN
.
On the other hand, if ǫ(z) = 0 then Eq. (12) states
that:
δ(z + 1)− δ(z) = δ(z)− δ(z − 1), (18)
that is, δ has a constant slope around z. If for all z′ <
z we have ǫ(z′) = 0, then the slope must be constant
through this entire region. Since δ(−N) = 0, the slope
can only be negative (i.e. increasing toward the left) if
δ(z) < 0, which proves Eq. (16) for this case. Otherwise,
let z′ < z be the largest integer such that ǫ(z′) = ǫmax.
Again the slope must be constant from z′, in which case,
by Eq. (18) the slope can only be negative if δ(z′) <
(2 + a)/2aN which implies δ(z) < (2 + a)/2aN .
Having proven Eq. (16), and using the initial case
δ(N) = 0, we have shown
ǫtot ≡Wǫ(0)−
1
2
= δ(0) ≤
2 + a
2aN
, (19)
6which can be made arbitrarily small by taking the limit
N →∞.
The game described in this section shows that a strong
coin-flipping protocol with linear cheat detection can be
serially composed to obtain a strong coin-flipping proto-
col with arbitrarily small bias. The conclusion is that
quantum strong coin-flipping protocols with linear cheat
detection cannot exist.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Using serial composition of coin-flipping we have es-
tablished an upper bound on the amount of cheat de-
tection possible in quantum protocols for coin-flipping
and bit-commitment. We have also presented evidence
that serially composing quadratic cheat sensitive proto-
cols does not lead to an improvement in the amount of
cheat detection. We speculate that quadratic or worse
cheat sensitivity (b ≥ 2) cannot be composed in series to
obtain weak coin-flipping with arbitrarily small bias. We
also speculate that cheat detection better than quadratic
(b < 2) does not exist for bit-commitment or strong coin-
flipping, and probably not for weak coin-flipping either.
Nevertheless, linear cheat detection in weak coin-
flipping remains an open, though unlikely, possibility. In
fact, by serially composing weak coin-flipping with lin-
ear cheat detection, it is not hard to show that one can
construct a weak coin-flipping protocol with a bias of
exactly zero. The apparent contradiction with the re-
sult of Lo and Chau [10] is resolved by noting that they
only considered protocols with a fixed number of rounds.
However, there are protocols where the number of rounds
is variable and possibly arbitrarily large (a good classi-
cal example is rock-paper-scissors), while still having a
zero probability of going on forever. For these protocols
the measurements cannot be delayed to the final round,
and therefore the analysis of Lo and Chau does not ap-
ply. These protocols can always be truncated to a finite
number of rounds, though, at the cost of allowing an ar-
bitrarily small bias.
Other questions that remain open include: What hap-
pens to serial composition of quadratic cheat detection
in the large bias regime? What can be said for other
functional forms of cheat detection versus bias, includ-
ing cases where one party may be a able to cheat by a
small amount without getting caught? And of course,
the main question—whether or not weak coin-flipping
with arbitrarily small bias can be achieved as a quan-
tum protocol—remains unresolved.
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA
Let T be a binary tree. We will use the variable x to
denote a binary node of T and y to denote a leaf.
Associated with T there is a function PW (y) on the
leaf nodes which takes the values zero or one. The func-
tion can be extended to the rest of the nodes by defining
PW (x) as the average of the function on its two descen-
dants. In terms of coins, PW is simply the probability of
winning when playing honestly starting from the given
node. The function corresponds to the coin outcomes on
the leaf nodes if the goal is to obtain 1, and otherwise the
coin outcome is 1−PW (y). To obtain a fair coin toss, we
require that PW equal 1/2 on the root node. Otherwise,
the function and the tree are arbitrary.
We also arbitrarily label the two outgoing edges from
each binary node as up and down, and define ∆(x) =
PW (x
↑) − PW (x↓). Finally, let D(x) be the depth of
node x, with the root node having depth zero.
Lemma: Given a tree T and function PW as described
above, the following equality holds:∑
x
2−D(x)∆(x)2 = 1. (A1)
Proof: ∆(x) is a linear combination of PW (x) on its de-
scendants, which in turn is a linear combination of PW (y)
on the leaf nodes. Therefore the left-hand side of the
above equation is a quadratic polynomial of PW (y).
Fix a leaf node y. The function PW (y) only appears
in ∆(x) if y is a descendant of x, in which case it has a
coefficient of ±2D(x)+1−D(y). The coefficient of PW (y)2
in this polynomial is therefore given by
D(y)−1∑
i=0
2−i22(i+1−D(y)) = 22(1−D(y))
(
2D(y) − 1
)
. (A2)
Fix a second leaf node y′ 6= y. Let x′ be the unique node
that has y as a descendant along one branch and y′ along
the other. The coefficient of PW (y)PW (y
′) is
2

D(x′)−1∑
i=0
2−i+2(i+1)−D(y)−D(y
′)

− 2D(x′)−D(y)−D(y′)+3
= −23−D(y)−D(y
′), (A3)
where the only negative term is contributed by ∆(x′).
Note the extra factor of 2 accounting for the double oc-
currence of PW (y)PW (y
′).
7Combining these results, the left-hand side of Eq. (A1)
is
4
∑
y
2−D(y)PW (y)2 − 4
[∑
y
2−D(y)PW (y)
]2
. (A4)
Note that the factor in brackets is just PW at the root
node, which must equal 1/2. The left summand can be
simplified by using PW (y)
2 = PW (y), in which case it can
also be written in terms of PW at the root node. We have
shown that the left-hand side equals 4(1/2)−4(1/2)2 = 1
as desired.
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